Administrative Justice in Europe:
The EU Acquis, good practice and recent developments

Working Paper submitted for the Twinning Project

Support to more efficient, effective and modern operation and functioning of the Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia

by

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I. Introduction

A. Purpose of the present paper

Administrative Justice plays a crucial role for the application of EU law. To a large extent, EU legislation concerns administrative law, and authorities lacking the quality of a “court” in the meaning of Art 234 ECT and Art 35 EUT cannot cooperate with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg. The accession of a state to the Union depends \textit{inter alia} on its ability to fully implement and apply the large block of legislation found in the \textit{Acquis Communautaire}. The Twinning Project “Support to more efficient, effective and modern operation and functioning of the Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia” seeks to support Croatia’s accession to the Union in this crucial matter.

The purpose of the present paper lies in a broad outline of several key building stones of Administrative Justice in Europe. On the one hand, it shall address recent developments throughout Europe. On the other hand, an overview of the EU \textit{Acquis Communautaire} concerning Administrative Justice, especially administrative courts' procedure, shall be given. To a large extent, similar issues will have to be addressed under both angles as the two most important developments are the adaptation of Administrative Justice to meet the requirements of Art 6 ECHR and the EU \textit{Acquis}.

B. Method

It is beyond the scope of this paper (and the ability of any single author) to describe trends in development in all 27 member states of the Union. Such an endeavour would also suffer from a degree of detail and complexity which would render it almost useless for the task at hand. There is, however, one feature of Administrative Justice shared by the member states as well as the EU law in the field: The importance of a consistent system of administrative procedure and Administrative Justice far outweighs that of individual features of the respective systems. Therefore, we can look at such individual features from the point of view of larger systems. I will primarily focus on the English, French and German systems of Administrative Justice and deal with the more specific issues from that perspective. This approach also falls in line with the peculiarity of the EU \textit{Acquis Communautaire}.
in this field, which mostly requires a consistent and effective system rather than containing detailed provisions.

C. Overview

In a first step, the scope and role of Administrative Justice for the rule of law and in the constitutional balance of powers will be addressed (II.). This is a necessary step before dealing with the EU “Acquis” in the field (III.). On this basis, the Organisation of Administrative Justice (IV.), the Scope of Jurisdiction (V.) and several questions of Procedure (VI.) will be investigated. The findings will be summarized in a final chapter „Summary and Conclusions” (VII.).

II. The Scope and Role of Administrative Justice

A. Scope of Administrative Justice

At first glance, the term “Administrative Justice” may appear clear enough. There are, however, several phenomena that may or may not be meant to be included, depending on the respective context. The processes of administrative review by the administrative authority of higher tiers usually fall beyond the scope of Administrative Justice. Such review through an independent authority which does not fully qualify as a court, however, must be considered in the context of the broad meaning of “court” in Art 234 ECT and 35 EUT, and to some extent even under Art 6 ECHR.¹ Furthermore, there may exist a special jurisdiction of constitutional courts (eg fundamental rights complaints) or other (criminal or civil, eg state liability) courts that may subject the “administration”² to a judicial process of review. Finally, several means have been developed which do not fit the standard idea of Administrative Justice, like Ombudsmen or mediation procedures.

In line with the purpose of the twinning project, this paper will use a narrow definition of “Administrative Justice” as the organisation, powers and procedures of the courts that carry the bulk of the control of “administration” by legal standards. The means mentioned above deserve consideration in that context, but they will not be at the centre of attention.

¹ Cf infra III.
² This term is used as the concrete object of review, usually “administrative acts”, may very broadly; cf infra V.A.
B. Position in the separation of powers

“Administrative Justice” seems to unite judicial and executive powers. To some extent, it is characterized by overlapping functions from both branches of government; administrative courts are part of the judiciary in a formal sense, but the material object of their powers is the executive branch. This special situation is reflected in the typical problems arising under it, for example the review in cases of administrative discretion or whether administrative courts may issue administrative acts in certain situations.

The relationship with the legislative branch is somewhat less problematic due to the clear hierarchy involved, as Administrative Justice is subject to the law. Tensions may arise from the role of administrative courts in systems that subject laws passed by Parliament to constitutional review, or from questions of political responsibility of the executive branch to Parliament.

C. Concepts

Under English law, Administrative Justice is part of the competences of the ordinary courts; there are no specialised administrative courts. This “anglosaxon” solution avoids problems that may arise between two systems within the judiciary. Due to the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, the courts are also clearly subject to Parliament; since the Human Rights Act, they are empowered to review parliamentary legislation, but can only issue a declaration of incompatibility which does not affect the legal force of the act in question. The relationship vis à vis the executive branch is shaped by a general judicial self restraint.

France, on the other hand, has a three-tier, specialised system of administrative courts with the Conseil d'État as its supreme institution. The Conseil Constitutionnel has little impact on Administrative Justice as its control over laws is only exercised ex ante and courts cannot interact with it. The administrative courts are bound by law, although to a certain extent, the standards applied result from other sources (namely general principles of law; “principes généraux”). The intensity of control varies, but in general preserving the ability of the executive branch to fulfil its duties enjoys respect.

3 Section 4 Human Rights Act 1998.
In Germany, Administrative Justice is applied by a three-tier\(^4\), specialised system of administrative courts. There are several peculiar features in comparison to France or England, as well as to most other European countries. Several special branches of administrative courts have been established, namely for tax law and social law. The control of the executive branch is rather detailed and the courts leave a relatively small room for discretion. The issue of constitutionality of laws can be referred to the Federal Constitutional Court. Furthermore, decisions by the administrative courts can be challenged through a special complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) to the Federal Constitutional Court. The detailed scrutiny applied by the latter in some cases has lead to criticism of it becoming a fourth tier of Administrative Justice. Overall, the German system is characterized by the far reaching constitutionalization of the entire legal system.

In other European countries, Administrative Justice shows considerable similarities to the three examples shown above, notwithstanding the inevitable peculiarities that arise from history, legal culture or constitutional and political background. In Austria, for example, the powers of the Constitutional Court create problems similar to those in Germany, despite considerable differences in the overall balance between the courts. On the other hand, a certain judicial self restraint can be found which appears closer to French or English practice.

**D. ECHR Dimension**

Administrative procedure and Administrative Justice are strongly influenced by the guarantees of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), especially through the procedural guarantees under Art 6 ECHR. Although the guarantees only apply to procedures concerning “civil” and “criminal” matters, both fields have been subject to an extensive interpretation through the Strasbourg institutions. They clearly apply to a variety of administrative matters like certain aspects of expropriation or of the regulation of professions. It is quite difficult to draw a line

\(^*\) The following refers to the federal level; Administrative Justice at the state level may differ in some aspects.
separating the cases that are subject to Art 6 ECHR from those that are not. Under the EU Acquis, the separation has been set aside by the ECJ.

**E. EU Dimension**

The national judge has been described as a “Community judge” insofar as he or she can be considered part of the decentralized judiciary of the European Community and, later, the European Union. As the role of Administrative Justice is quite limited in the third and second pillar, the focus on the first pillar expressed by the term “Community judge” is still justified. The following considerations will also deal mostly with Community law.

The key functions of the “Community judge” are the application of directly applicable Community law granting precedent over national law, the interpretation of national law in conformity with Community and Union law, and in certain circumstances the reference of questions for preliminary ruling to the ECJ. In this capacity, the administrative judge does not differ from the criminal or civil judge.

**III. The EU “Acquis”**

**A. The Acquis Communautaire concerning Administrative Justice**

EU law does not entail a general set of detailed rules on administrative procedure or Administrative Justice, neither for the EU judiciary in Luxembourg (ECJ, Court of first instance, chambers) nor for the national courts in their capacity as “Community judges”. Special rules may exist, but they do not follow a general or extensive system.

As a consequence, general principles of law have been identified by the ECJ to fill in this void. Nevertheless, national courts (for the definition see B.) are constituted by their national laws on organisation and apply their domestic laws on procedure within their domestic scope of jurisdiction. General principles of law may modify or even extend national provisions, but they do not supplant for them. The

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6 Cf infra III.D.
most important principles are those of Non-discrimination and Effectiveness of Administrative Justice (C.) and Fundamental procedural rights (D.). In some areas, the case law of the ECJ or secondary Community law have provided for more detailed rules; some examples will be addressed under E.

**B. The definition of “court”**

In the context of the *Acquis Communautaire* in Administrative Justice, the term “court” can take on different meanings. Under Art 234 ECT and Art 35 EUT, a “court” that can refer to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling is defined broadly as any formally independent authority deciding a dispute based on legal standards. Under Art 6 ECHR und the fundamental procedural rights of EU law, to a large extent inspired by Art 6 ECHR, a “court” or “tribunal” can be described as any independent authority deciding a dispute and meeting further guarantees of independence, like sufficient duration of office or lack of any appearance of partiality. Finally, the scope of courts as defined under national law will usually, but not necessarily be narrower than both “European” definitions. On the other hand, independent administrative authorities at the national level may qualify as courts in the meaning of Art 234 ECT and Art 35 EUT as well as Art 6 ECHR.

The rules contained in the *Acquis Communautaire* apply to all “courts” in the sense of Art 234 ECT and Art 35 EUT. The following considerations will focus on the usually narrower meaning of “court” in the national legal order. The fact that there are various other independent authorities, however, should be remembered as a side note.

**C. The general rule – Non-discrimination and Effectiveness**

Under settled case law of the ECJ, national law governs the application of Community law by national authorities in so far as it does not discriminate against Community law, and as it guarantees an effective application of Community law. Both criteria allow for a large room for interpretation. As a general rule in Community

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7 Cf for example ECJ case C-54/96, *Dorsch Consult*, ECR 1997, I-4961.

8 For example, a national court may be considered partial in a specific case under Art 6 ECHR and therefore not qualify as an independent tribunal.

law, discrimination should be construed broadly to include indirect discrimination. Effectiveness does not equal perfect effectiveness, but exceptions like time-limits on claims should be narrowly defined and well reasoned.

Another doctrine closely related to the effectiveness of Community Law is the broadly defined position as a party to administrative or judicial procedure. In contrast to those legal systems that demand a more clearly defined subjective right, in Community law a qualified interest in the outcome of the respective procedure is sufficient. Therefore, national law may have to grant broader access to Community law procedures than to those solely under national law. A similar result of the effectiveness doctrine can be found in the area of interim relief or injunctions; the provisional protection of rights under Community law or of Community interests are awarded a prominent role in the case law of the ECJ and may go beyond national law.10

An example for some of these effects can be found in a national provision providing for a time-limit or broad effects of res iudicata on demands for the repayment of unlawfully obtained government funds11. It may apply equally to national and Community cases. Considering the crucial role of repayment of aids granted in violation of the Community's state aid regime, this national rule may be seen as an indirect discrimination. It most certainly renders Community law inefficient to a degree that the ECJ would not tolerate. Furthermore, a third party – the competitor of the enterprise receiving the aid – must be granted a right to pursue the full application of state aid law.12 Depending on the national legal system and tradition, this may amount to considerable challenges.

**D. Fundamental procedural rights**

The general rule of non-discrimination and effectiveness is further expanded by fundamental procedural rights as part of EU primary law (namely Art 6 EUT, general principles of law). These rights are binding not only on the Union, but also on the member states insofar as they act for the Union. In that regard, again

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10 For a very far-reaching decision see ECJ Case C-97/91, Borelli, ECR 1992, I-6313.
11 Cf for example ECJ Case C-24/95, Alcan, ECR 1997, I-1591; ECJ 18th July 2007, Case C-119/05, Lucchini.
12 For example ECJ Case C-144/91, Demoor, ECR 1992, I-6613.
national law governs the application of Community law unless it is superseded by Community law.

Fundamental procedural rights consist of several rights. At their core is Art 6 ECHR, enhanced through Art 13 ECHR. According to the case law of the ECJ, its guarantees are not limited to civil rights and criminal charges, but apply to all procedures. The most important effect stemming from this doctrine is that for the Community legal order, administrative procedure and Administrative Justice are fully subject to the guarantees of Art 6 ECHR.13

The substance of fundamental procedural rights can be summarized as follows:14

– the right to a decision by an independent and impartial tribunal; if the tribunal (or tribunals) decides (decide) as the superior instance over non-tribunals, at least one tribunal must have full jurisdiction over law and facts;
– the right to have access to the information necessary to present his or her position, the right to be heard and public access to procedures; to some extent, granting information and hearing the party’s position can take place in administrative procedure, but at least the possibility to do so must be maintained for the process of Administrative Justice. The right to be heard and the guarantee of public procedure are best served by and will usually require oral hearings before at least one authority with the quality of a tribunal;
– respect for the principles of equality of procedural rights; this right plays a particularly important role in Administrative Justice as the roles will usually change from administrative procedure to judicial process as the administrative authority becomes a party before the administrative court. This peculiarity of Administrative Justice may require special rules to ensure a balance between the parties with regard to their procedural position;
– the right of being advised, defended and represented, when necessary supported by legal aid, as well as the confidentiality of legal advice; as not all administrative do or can provide for access to qualified legal representation, it must be maintained within the realm of Administrative Justice;

– the right to a decision within a reasonable time; according to ECJ, the reasonableness must be judged for the time between the initiation of an administrative procedure and its judicial review. Problems often arise from complex systems of review where one or more levels of administrative review are followed by one or more levels of judicial review. If the latter relies strongly on cassatory decisions, the problem becomes exacerbated as the case will return to a lower level, from where another time-consuming review may begin;

– the right to be given the reasons for a decision. The reasons serve two purposes: to avoid arbitrary decisions, and to rationalize the review of decisions. The reasoning of the deciding authority forms the starting point of the process before administrative courts.

The above-mentioned guarantees can be fulfilled by different concepts of administrative procedure and Administrative Justice. They allow for some extent of flexibility due to open wording (e.g. “reasonable” time) and by looking at the entire chain of decisions on a case. Furthermore, the sheer variety of potential disputes ranging from, for example, small fines over building permits to highly complex planning acts in zoning or environmental protection requires a system that can adapt to those varying circumstances while respecting fundamental rights.

As a final note, the special guarantees in criminal matters should be mentioned. In so far as administrative courts review administrative sanctions, the presumption of innocence for every accused and the principle of ne bis in idem will apply, at least in principle.16

E. Examples

Community law does not entail general rules for Administrative Justice in the member states beyond the broad principles laid down above. The only legal act providing detailed (although sectoral) rules on procedure is the Community Customs Code which compiles the rules and procedures applicable to goods traded between the Community and third countries.17

16 The case law of the ECJ seems to maintain a less rigid approach towards what it considers administrative sanctions; cf for example Case C-210/00, Käserei Chamignon, ECR 2002, I-6453.
Scattered rules on procedure may be found in various acts of Community legislation, or they may have been developed in the case law of the ECJ. Apart from the examples in state aid law mentioned above, two other prominent examples shall be mentioned: The directives on public procurement do not only provide for a detailed set of rules for the procurement process, but also for the effective review of decisions taken by the contracting authorities and entities. Art 2 Directive 89/665/EEC contains inter alia the following provisions which can be considered a rough outline of a system of Administrative Justice:

- Where bodies responsible for review procedures are not judicial in character, written reasons for their decisions shall always be given;
- provision must be made to guarantee procedures of judicial review or review by another body which is a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 ECT independent of both the contracting authority and the review body;
- the members of such an independent body shall be appointed and leave office under the same conditions as members of the judiciary;
- at least the President of this independent body shall have the same legal and professional qualifications as members of the judiciary;
- the independent body shall take its decisions following a procedure in which both sides are heard.

In a similar though less intrusive way, some directives concerning regulation of certain markets provide for authorities and procedures. For example, Art 4 Directive 2002/21/EC deals with a “Right of appeal” against the decisions of a national regulatory authority. The appeal body must be independent and shall have the appropriate expertise available. If the appeal body is not judicial in character, its

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18 Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors; Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts; Directive 89/665/EEC on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts as amended by Directive 92/50/EEC; Directive 92/13/EEC coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors as amended by Directive 2006/97/EC.

decision shall be subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of Art 234 ECT.

These examples show that secondary law may require special organisational or procedural measures at the national level, depending on the system of Administrative Justice in place. While it is not possible to meet all requirements in a general manner, it is of course easier to adapt a system where most requirements are already met.

IV. Organisation

A. Independent authorities and courts

A first decision on organisation has to decide on the role of independent administrative authorities as part of the review system which will usually acquire the quality of “courts” under Art 234 ECT and Art 35 EUT and often that of a tribunal under Art 6 ECHR. In theory, the entire review system could consist of independent administrative authorities, but the common European standard shows a clear preference for courts with full judicial guarantees and the formal quality of a court in the meaning under national law.

This does, however, not exclude a certain role for independent administrative authorities. The establishment of such authorities is an option in certain areas, like the above-mentioned procurement law and telecommunication law. For those authorities, the legislature may also provide for different rules of judicial review; for example, in a two-tier system of administrative courts, direct appeal to the higher court may be granted.20 On the other hand, such authorities can give rise to problems as they constitute a hybrid branch of government that is neither judicial nor fully administrative in nature.21

20 The highest esteem for certain independent administrative authorities is expressed in Austria, where appeal to the (sole) administrative court is completely excluded, leaving only appeal to the constitutional court. This peculiarity is, however, often viewed as an undue limitation of judicial protection.

**B. Centralised or decentralised**

Only the smaller EU member states have established a centralised administrative court. In medium size states, there are usually two tiers of Administrative Justice, and in the larger ones often three.\(^{22}\) One exception is Austria which as a medium-size country only has one administrative court (for federal and state matters). The lack of lower administrative courts is, however, compensated for by various authorities enjoying a quasi-judicial status through their organisation, procedure and *res iudicata* quality of their decisions.\(^{23}\)

The relationships between the various levels of Administrative Justice differ considerably;\(^{24}\) in this aspect of internal organisation, the ECHR, the EU *Acquis* and usually the national constitutions leave a lot of leeway. The crucial issue of the appeal system will be dealt with under VI.F.

**C. Federal and regional systems**

Federal organisation of or regional autonomy within a state will be reflected in its judicial system, though often just as modifications of an overall system (eg Germany, Austria, Italy).\(^{25}\) Therefore this issue does not warrant further consideration.

**D. Specialization**

The system of Administrative Justice is usually a unitary one, possible competences of ordinary or constitutional courts notwithstanding. In Germany, different branches of Administrative Justice have been established for matters of general administrative law, tax law and social law. This formal difference should, 

\(^{22}\) Cf for details and exceptions from the broad rule Observatory for Institutional and legal Changes of the University of Limoges, Administrative Justice in Europe (2007) 24-29.

\(^{23}\) Essentially the Independent Administrative Senates; cf Observatory for Institutional and legal Changes of the University of Limoges, Administrative Justice in Europe (2007) 26 and 31. Reform projects to establish a second level of Administrative Justice have been pursued for several decades now with very limited results.

\(^{24}\) Observatory for Institutional and legal Changes of the University of Limoges, Administrative Justice in Europe (2007) 24-29.

however, not be overestimated; most countries deal with a requirement of specialisation within the unitary structure by specialisation within the courts and through the distribution of cases.\

**E. Selection of judges**

The selection of judges is a question of internal organisation and therefore usually beyond the harmonizing effects of the ECHR and EU law. Therefore, a wide variety of recruitment systems can be found among EU member states. The only requirement and general standard is the quality and the independence of the administrative courts. Judges are overwhelmingly (though not necessarily exclusively) jurists with varying degrees of experience. They may be specifically trained within the system of Administrative Justice or share a training and recruitment system with the entire judiciary. As an alternative, administrative judges may also be recruited from various (usually law related) other professions (essentially attorneys, jurists from various administrative positions, university professors).

**F. Lay participation**

The role of laypersons is quite limited in most European court systems with the exception of penal law. In the absence of a jury system, lay judges may form the deciding senate with professional judges (for example in Germany). The participation of lay judges requires decision by a senate. Furthermore, lay participation may play a certain role in special administrative (especially independent regulatory) authorities where technical and economic knowledge is required.

**G. Collegiality or single judge**

Decision by a senate of several judges (collegiality) is often reserved for important or appeal cases; it can also be due to the desired participation of lay judges. Senates may provide better results through internal deliberation and the

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contribution of differing views, but they also require specific rules for decision-finding (which can be a source of errors) and require more human resources. Due to the increasing importance of economic considerations, the trend for multi-tier systems is to increase the role of the single judge in the first tier\textsuperscript{28}, while appeal decisions appear to be reserved for senates still.

\textbf{H. Role of other courts}

A special administrative judiciary interacts with other courts and requires a definition and separation of jurisdiction. In this regard, European legal systems again show a high degree of diversity often rooted in constitutional provisions and legal traditions. There are, however, several typical points of friction.

Where a constitutional court exists, it may also exercise a control of Administrative Justice\textsuperscript{29} or directly of the administration\textsuperscript{30}, acting as a specialised administrative court. Review or parallel powers often result in conflicts\textsuperscript{31}.

With regard to the ordinary (criminal and civil) courts the problem is concentrated in parallel powers. They usually arise in cases that have a dual nature, like state liability, the penal law consequences of administrative malfeasance or the civil law aspects of matters such as the compensation for expropriation. Social insurance law may also be of a dual material nature (parts public, parts civil); civil and administrative courts may share jurisdiction or it may be given exclusively to one tier of the judiciary.

\textbf{V. Scope of Jurisdiction}

\textbf{A. Acts subject to review}

The core function of Administrative Justice is the review of administrative acts. This general description still allows for a large variety of the concrete national provisions.

\textsuperscript{28} For example as an option for the Verwaltungsgericht in Germany, for most cases of less importance for the Tribunal administratif in France.

\textsuperscript{29} For example in Germany, Art 93 Basic Law.

\textsuperscript{30} For example in Austria, Art 144 Federal Constitutional Law.

\textsuperscript{31} For a broader view cf Observatory for Institutional and legal Changes of the University of Limoges, Administrative Justice in Europe (2007) 32-33.
The classic administrative act is based on public-authority and affects the legal position of individuals. Such acts may be individual or general, normative (namely administrative decision) or merely factual (for example the stopping of a car for control). Such administrative acts must be under the review of administrative courts. From a procedural perspective, there are, however, different options to effectuate such a review (cf infra VI.B.).

The question of cases which are not simply administrative in nature has already been touched on in the context of the role of other courts. The administration may act in the form of contracts, which may again belong to either public law or civil law. The provision of services (especially services of public interest) and payments (welfare, stipends, pensions etc) may be based on administrative decisions or on contracts under public or civil law. Whether these are subject to the review of administrative depends on their legal basis and the relationship of administrative courts to other courts. A similar issue arises with state liability.

B. Matters of Fact and Law

The primary focus of judicial review is to ensure the adherence of the executive branch to the rule of law. Regarding the review of the facts established by the administrative authorities, two options exist: The administrative court makes sure that the administrative authority has lawfully established the facts, without power to investigate the facts on its own; or the administrative court has the power to investigate the facts and put its own findings in the place of those established by the administrative authorities.

Fundamental procedural rights require a review of the facts by a tribunal. Though not impossible, it is notoriously difficult to meet that requirement under the first option described above.32 Furthermore, it will often lead to a cassatory decision as the administrative authorities will have to re-establish the facts.

The second option, empowering the courts to investigate the facts, still allows for varying degrees of scrutiny depending on a variety of circumstances. Matters to

consider are whether the law of administrative procedure provides for detailed rules on establishing the facts, the questions raised before the administrative court or simply a legal tradition concerning the trust of courts into the quality of the procedures performed by administrative authorities.

C. Scope of decisions

Administrative courts may follow the principle of cassation or the principle of reformative decision. Under the first, the courts will only repeal administrative acts; if the need for a new act arises, the matter has to be referred back to the respective administrative authority; that act may then be challenged in court again. Under the latter, administrative courts may not only repeal, but also change an administrative act.

The reformative system has clear advantages, especially when it comes to respecting the need for a decision in reasonable time. The only reason for the system of cassation can be found in considerations of the separation and balance of powers. The reformative system further emphasises a de facto superiority of the judicial over the executive branch which may be considered inappropriate within legal and constitutional traditions with a high regard for the standing of the executive branch, like Austria.

D. Margin of appreciation

Similar arguments apply to the question in how far administrative courts should respect a margin of appreciation exercised by the administrative authorities. This issue can be addressed from a formal or from a material perspective.

From the formal perspective, administrative law may explicitly grant margins of appreciation to be exercised solely through the executive branch. The respective decisions have to stay within the margin set by law, but they are not fully determined by law. The choice of one of the possible decisions within the established margin is subject to the political responsibility of the executive branch. When administrative courts have to confront the issue, only a system based on the principle of cassation offers a simple answer: the court will only review whether the margin of appreciation has been respected; if not, the decision will revert to the administrative authority. Under a reformative system, two solutions exist: the court can either act as court of
cassation in this specific regard (as an exemption), or the court can itself exercise appreciation (following the general rule).

Under a material perspective, the problem is more general: Every legal provision suffers from the lack of absolute precision that is inherent to language. Hence, there is always some room for interpretation. In this regard, administrative courts usually exercise some judicial self-restraint in review. In contrast to cases of an explicit margin of appreciation, however, this restraint is not a question of black or white, but just of a certain shade of grey depending *inter alia* on the prevailing idea of the separation of powers as well as legal and constitutional traditions.

**E. Protection against administrative inaction**

Protection against administrative inaction is a standard responsibility of administrative courts; it is also required under the EU *Acquis*. In its concrete solution, the questions addressed above reappear: What is the role of courts vis-à-vis the executive branch? From the perspective of the administrative authorities, the least intrusive solution is a judgment that only decides on the unlawfulness of inaction and requires the administrative authority to act; the ECT provides for a solution after this model in its Art 232. In the more complex administrative system of the member states, however, courts often have power to act in the place of the administrative authority - either directly, or after a first judgment has not been followed.

If Administrative Justice follows the principle of reformation, there is no specific problem with the court acting in place of the administrative authority; the only problematic areas are those (as in general) where administrative law explicitly grants margins of appreciation.

**F. Law and Constitution**

Finally, there are differing models for the role that administrative courts play in the constitutional judiciary; the latter has to be understood broadly and refers to courts deciding constitutional issues, irrespective of whether they are termed “constitutional” court.

Where special constitutional courts are established (eg Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria), the issue usually becomes one of the relationship between the courts. Then, there are systems where all judges are also constitutional judges.
(Scandinavia, to some extent Great Britain), or where essentially no powers of a constitutional judiciary exist (eg the Netherlands). Here, the issue will follow more or less the general rules. Finally, special situations may arise when a body making decisions on constitutional issues is not a court or only has a rather limited competence, like the **Conseil constitutionnel** in France or the **Cour d’arbitrage** in Belgium.

Whether and to what extent administrative courts will apply constitutional law also depends on whether administrative law clearly determines administrative action or whether it just provides the legal framework; in the first case constitutional law will be mostly mediated through administrative law, in the second case it will play a larger role.

### VI. Procedure

**A. Standing to sue**

In Europe, there are essentially two concepts defining the access of individuals to administrative procedure and/or administrative courts. The broader of the two belongs to the French tradition of administrative law and is based on a qualified interest of an individual (*intérêt pour agir*). The requirement of a qualified interest differentiates this concept from one of *actio popularis*, which is not to be found among EU member states. While depending on concrete interpretation, it usually provides for a relatively wide involvement of individuals including, for example, competitors of an entrepreneur receiving favourable treatment or interest groups in planning law (zoning, protection of habitats etc).

The narrower concept is based on the German tradition of administrative law and requires the existence of a more or less explicitly granted and defined subjective right. While in theory, such rights could be granted generously, in practice this is often not the case. For examples, in the two areas of law mentioned above (competitors, planning law), access of individuals to administrative procedure and/or administrative courts is in general much more narrowly defined.

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33 Observatory for Institutional and legal Changes of the University of Limoges, Administrative Justice in Europe (2007) 50-52.
The concept based on qualified interest has also been incorporated into EU law through the case law of the ECJ. A national system based on the same concept will find it easier to comply with EU Acquis, although the rights-based concept is flexible enough to meet the requirements; it will just lead to a certain dichotomy between purely national cases and cases under EU law.

**B. Specific actions or general clause**

Access to Administrative Justice can be based on specific actions, namely for review of administrative acts or a category of administrative acts, against administrative inaction, for payments or services etc. Alternatively, a general clause may provide broad access to Administrative Justice, possibly with certain exemptions. Under both approaches, the limits of Administrative Justice have to be defined, mostly against other courts; hence, the chosen approach will also depend on the overall position of administrative courts within the judiciary.

**C. Oral hearings**

Fundamental procedural rights include a right to be heard. In most cases, this will require oral hearings before at least one instance of tribunal quality, usually the first instance of the administrative court system. Oral hearings may not be required in special situations, namely for purely legal arguments. To ensure that oral hearings are not unduly refused, they should be obligatory unless the parties agree to waive their right.

**D. Rationalization**

Certain rules are designed to simplify, streamline and rationalize procedure before administrative courts, such as de minimis rules for appeals, deadlines for appeals, time-limits for claims, effects of res iudicata etc. The introduction of such measures is first and foremost a political decision, only limited by fundamental procedural rights. Art 6 ECHR allows, however, for a wide variety of measures to

guarantee the proper functioning of the courts as long as access is maintained in principle.35

**E. Role of internal administrative review**

Administrative Justice and internal administrative review are closely connected. An encompassing internal review adds an additional instance and increases the risk of delays (and of a violation of the right to decision in reasonable time). For this reason, the structure and procedural law of administrative courts have to take any internal administrative review mechanism into account. For example, the centralized single administrative court in Austria reflects a complex internal administrative review that usually encompasses one or two instances, often through independent administrative authorities. In contrast, Germany’s two to three-tier system of Administrative Justice is only accompanied by an internal administrative review (Widerspruchsverfahren) that is essentially integrated into the judicial proceedings.

**F. Review of lower administrative courts**

In a multi-tier system of Administrative Justice, there exist several options to decide the relationship between higher and lower courts. The key question is in how far lower court judgments are subject to appeal. Fundamental procedural rights require only one level of tribunals,36 the if and how of any appeal process are therefore mostly a political decision. Several considerations may contribute to shape this decision, like the speed and efficiency of Administrative Justice, the proper functioning of the supreme administrative court or the importance of cohesive case law and practice of judgments.

**G. Enforcement**

Under the rule of law, administrative authorities should follow the judgments of administrative courts without reserve or delay. Swift and unconditional compliance is also required to avoid violations of the principle of effectiveness of EU law and of

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fundamental procedural rights. Some problems of effectiveness, however, can never be ruled out completely.

Their importance is reduced under a system following the principle of reformation. Apart from that, the general discipline of public service should to some extent support the effectiveness of administrative court judgements; possible sanctions include disciplinary measures, sanctions under criminal law (abuse of office etc) or a possible invocation of state liability. These instruments can be reinforced by giving administrative courts the power to issue sanctions against officials for non-compliance. Beyond that, special rules of enforcement may be enacted like those existing for civil procedure.

VII. Summary and Conclusions

As the member states still enjoy a large degree of autonomy regarding the organisation and procedure of administrative courts, there are only few overarching tenets of Administrative Justice. Broad access to and comprehensive protection through administrative courts are required by the EU Acquis entailing fundamental procedural rights as well as the principles of effectiveness and non-discrimination.

Within their autonomy, member states have established a variety of systems of Administrative Justice. While a general grouping into French, German and English traditions is possible, these are not to be seen as rigid and closed models. A good and modern system of Administrative Justice can be based on any of the models or combine features from different models. The most important aspect is internal consistency: the individual features of organization and procedure must be harmonized, and they must take due consideration of administrative procedure and the jurisdictions of other courts.